We review recent empirical work on the determinants of the cross-section of expected returns. This literature, which includes the influential work by Fama and French (1992, 1993), tends to ignore the positive evidence on beta and to overemphasize the importance of book-tomarket. Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) show that beta significantly explains cross-sectional variation in average returns, but that size also has incremental explanatory power. We find that, while statistically significant, the incremental benefit of size given beta is surprisingly small economically. Book-to-market is a weak determinant of the cross-sectional variation in average returns among large firms and, as others have documented, it fails to account for return differences related to momentum and trading volume.
Introduction
Since the publication of the influential work of Fama and French (1992, 1993) on the determinants of the cross-section of expected returns, there has been a tendency in the literature to ignore the positive evidence on beta and negative evidence on book-to-market (B/M). In this paper, we review some of the recent empirical work and provide a balanced view. With regard to beta, the focus here is on the practical issue of whether betas defined with respect to commonly-employed market proxies provide useful information about expected returns. The possibility that a more comprehensive market index might yield different results is recognized, but not pursued. We expand on the evidence in Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) (KSS) concerning the ability of beta and size to explain cross-sectional variation in average returns for 3 observation in KSS that the ex ante market risk premium is about as likely to be 6% per year as zero (point estimate 0.24%, standard error 0.23% per month), given the FF (1992) evidence.
Despite this simple observation, much current discussion in the finance literature proceeds as if beta's complete lack of predictive power for expected returns has been firmly established and, by implication, can be expected to continue in the future. This is even more difficult to understand in light of the KSS finding that an alternative beta estimate, derived from annual return observations, is significantly positively related to average return. In some ways, this finding is consistent with a "world view" similar to that of a decade ago in which beta and size peacefully coexisted.
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Although the relation between B/M and estimated beta is weaker than the size-beta correlation, it may account for some of the explanatory power of B/M. Moreover, insofar as much of the B/M effect is driven by "mispricing," as several papers suggest [e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) ], a reasonable conjecture is that the effect will be smaller in the future. Fama and French (1996b) (FF) find that the simple regression t-statistics for the crosssectional coefficients on monthly and annual betas are small and nearly identical. This is due to the fact that their post-formation betas (for decile portfolios based on past beta rankings) estimated from either monthly or annual returns are nearly perfectly cross-sectionally correlated.
Reconciling the Differences Between Fama and French (1996b) and KSS
These results contrast sharply with those in KSS, reproduced here in Table 1 , which show annual betas to be significantly priced for a variety of portfolios. One wonders then how KSS could find 2 A recent paper by Kim (1995) finds that betas estimated from past monthly data are also significantly related to average returns and the significance of size is reduced when a maximum likelihood procedure is applied to individual securities. We experimented with an alternative errors-in-variables approach [Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Shanken (1992) ], but found that results based on the 100 size-then-beta portfolios were altered only slightly. such different results for monthly and annual betas when FF do not. The following two considerations appear to explain the differences between the results. First, unlike KSS, who also include AMEX firms from July 1964, FF restrict their sample to NYSE stocks. This has the effect of substantially reducing the range of estimated betas. For example, using equal-weighted annual index returns, the post-formation betas of NYSE decile portfolios formed by ranking stocks on past betas range from 0.78 to 1.27 (FF, 1995, table I) . In comparison, the corresponding range is 0.52 to 1.35 in KSS (1995, table I , average of vitile portfolios 1 and 2, and 19 and 20, respectively), an increase of nearly seventy percent. KSS obtain a much lower estimate of the large firm betas because the inclusion of AMEX stocks makes small stocks far more important in the CRSP equal-weighted index; thus, large stocks are relatively less risky compared to the index.
The second difference between FF (1996b) and KSS or this study is that FF compound equal-weighted monthly portfolio returns to obtain annual returns. That is, the portfolios are rebalanced each month, yielding annual returns that differ from buy-and-hold annual returns obtained by averaging the compounded annual returns on individual securities in a portfolio.
Table 1
Since the difference between monthly and annual betas increases as the betas deviate from one [Levhari and Levy (1977) and Handa, Kothari, and Wasley (1989) ], it is not surprising that the cross-sectional results in KSS are much more sensitive to the horizon over which beta is estimated. The reduction in range in FF, exacerbated by the fact that only ten portfolios are used in the cross-sectional regressions, appears to explain the low t-statistics for the coefficients on beta in Part B of Table I in FF (1996b) . The t-statistics cluster around 1.3, despite the fact that the estimated market risk premium is, in the case of the equal-weighted index, 65 basis points per month (7.8% per year). This is higher than the corresponding estimate in KSS Table II (54 basis points) , which has a t-statistic of 1.94. Thus, the low FF t-statistics are driven by an inherent lack of precision.
We are inclined to take a more positive view of cross-sectional beta-return regressions than Fama and French (1992, 1996b) . Both Roll and Ross (1994) and Kandel and Stambaugh (1995) emphasize that the equivalence between the mean-variance efficiency of an index and exact linearity of expected returns in the betas breaks down when the index is only "approximately" efficient. Roll and Ross argue, for example, that given a set of assets, it is conceivable that there are indices "close" to the efficient frontier that produce no relation between beta and mean return.
Kandel and Stambaugh, on the other hand, focus on the assets. They show that, when an index is approximately efficient with respect to a set of asset returns, the assets may be "repackaged" into (potentially unusual-looking) portfolios such that the return/beta relation is arbitrarily weak.
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While these insights are relevant to the interpretation of tests of asset pricing theories, they do not change the fact that a cross-sectional regression of returns on betas does provide information about the relation between the expected returns on the given assets and their betas on the given index. In many applications, this is the central issue.
Average Residuals from Return-Regressions
We agree with FF on the importance of examining average residuals from cross-sectional regressions. Average residuals are the basis for evaluating whether betas or other firm characteristics completely capture cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Although some of the deviations in Part B of Table III in FF appear to be quite large, the extent to which they are driven by random noise is not obvious. The multivariate literature on testing asset pricing relations addresses the statistical issue of whether observed residuals merely represent random ex 6 post fluctuations or, instead, are manifestations of a violation of the ex ante expected return relation. 4 Without minimizing the importance of this question, we prefer here to address an easier question --one which is more relevant to the issues raised by FF.
FF point to the large "CAPM pricing errors" for the extreme size and beta deciles and view their bivariate regression results (on size and beta), as well as those in KSS, as evidence that "size always adds substantially to β's description of average returns." Yet no information is provided on the extent to which size actually reduces the average residuals seen in their Table III! As KSS note, the incremental contribution that size makes to the prediction of returns depends not only on the size coefficient, but also on the magnitude of the residuals from an auxiliary regression of size on beta. Since beta and size are strongly (negatively) correlated, these residuals need not be very large.
Before we discuss average residuals from annual return models, we briefly consider summary statistics for 100 equal-weighted size-then-beta ranked portfolios from the CRSP universe of stocks. The portfolios are formed every July from 1927 to 1992 (66 years). Each year, all available securities are ranked first on their market capitalization of equity on June 30 and then on their betas estimated by regressing 24 to 60 months of past returns on the CRSP equalweighted index returns. 5 The post-formation betas are estimated using each portfolio's time series of annual buy-and-hold returns. The index used is the equal-weighted buy-and-hold annual return on all the CRSP securities available in that year. Table 2 , panels A-C reports average annual returns, average firm size in millions of dollars, and post-formation betas of the 100 size-beta portfolios. Average values for each size and beta decile portfolio are also reported in the last row and column of the table. There is a 7 substantial spread in betas, size, and average returns among the 100 portfolios. Average returns generally increase with beta and decrease with size. Average return is 14% per annum on the lowest beta decile and 20.4% for the highest beta decile. The spread in average returns across the size deciles is even more impressive, ranging from 13.3% for the largest decile to 25.4% for the smallest. The average returns on the beta portfolios within each size portfolio also exhibit considerable variation that is consistent with a positively-sloped risk-return relation. For example, the lowest-beta portfolio in the largest size decile earns 11.5% average annual return compared to 15.3% earned by the highest-beta portfolio in the largest size decile. While returns for the higher beta portfolios in the smallest size decile are erratic, they line up well with the post-formation annual betas in the bottom panel.
Table 2
Table 3, panels A-C, provide average residuals from annual Fama-MacBeth return models that include only size or (annual) beta, as well as the bivariate model with size and beta. The Fama-MacBeth regression models are:
where R pt is the buy-and-hold return on portfolio p for one year beginning from July 1 of year t to
June 30 of year t+1; β p is the full-period post-ranking beta of portfolio p, i.e., the slope coefficient from a time-series regression of annual buy-and-hold post-ranking portfolio returns on the returns for an equal-weighted portfolio of all the beta-size portfolios; Size pt-1 is the natural log of the average market capitalization in millions of dollars on June 30 of year t of the stocks in portfolio p; γ 0t , γ 1t , and γ 2t are regression parameters; and ε pt is the regression error. For each portfolio, average residual is calculated by averaging the estimated ε pt 's for portfolio p across time. We refer to a portfolio's average residual as its "deviation" from the model. The basic properties of (cross-sectional) regression residuals guarantee that the average deviation across the 100 portfolios is zero. Table 3 shows that for both the beta-only (size-beta) model, four (one) of the portfolios have deviations that exceed 4% and two (four) others exceed 3%. In contrast, for the size-only model, one deviation exceeds 10% and seven others exceed 5%. Most of these occur either in the lowest size portfolio or the smallest beta portfolio. The standard deviation of the 100 portfolio average residuals from the size-only model is 2.9%, compared to 1.5% for the size-beta model, and 1.8% for the beta-only model. These numbers suggest that the incremental effect of size on expected return (fitted value), given that beta is already considered, is small.
Table 3
A more direct measure of the incremental effect of size is given in Table 4 , panels A-B, for each portfolio. Panel A contains the difference between the absolute value of the portfolio deviation from the beta-only model and that for the size and beta model. Only two of these differences are greater than 2% in magnitude (maximum 2.1%). In contrast, seven portfolios have differences that exceed 4% (maximum 7.4%) when beta is added to the size-only model (see panel B). The standard deviation of the differences in panel B is 1.9% compared to only 0.8% in panel A. These observations substantiate our claim that the estimated incremental impact of size in explaining expected returns is fairly small, despite its statistical significance. We do not advocate ignoring this information, however, particularly in the applied context of trying to estimate a predictive model.
Table 4
We repeated the above analysis using monthly, rather than annual, portfolio returns as the To gain additional insight into the economic significance of the above findings, we repeated the analysis excluding the smallest 20% market capitalization stocks each year. In the literature, these smallest 20% stocks are generally referred to as "small stocks." The variability of the average residuals and the differences between absolute average residuals declines dramatically with the exclusion of (the economically less important) small stocks. Using annual returns, the variability of the average residuals from the beta-only model continues to be considerably smaller than that of the average residuals from the size-only model. This difference is small, but in the opposite direction using monthly portfolio returns.
Why annual betas?
We have presented evidence that estimates of beta from annual returns are significantly related to expected stock returns, both economically and statistically. A number of important questions arise in thinking about annual betas, however. For one thing, annual betas necessarily have a large estimation error component. Why, then, are these betas superior in "explaining" the cross-section of expected returns? It has long been recognized that if there are delays in the complete incorporation of information in security prices then betas estimated using high-frequency returns (e.g., daily returns) will be biased [Scholes and Williams (1977) ], Cohen et al. (1983) ]. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and Mech (1993) suggest that the time it takes for security prices to accurately incorporate available information is surprisingly long. For example, in the case of small capitalization stocks, the non-synchronous trading problem continues to be important using a monthly return measurement interval.
The bias in estimated betas due to non-synchronous trading is not reduced by simply expanding the time series of returns. It can be reduced, however, by increasing the length of the return measurement interval used in forming returns. Thus, it may be that the relative performance of annual and monthly betas is a situation in which a noisy but less biased annual beta estimate is better than a less variable but biased monthly beta estimate. FF (1992) use an alternative method (specifically, the Dimson (1979) beta obtained by summing the slopes on the contemporaneous and prior month's market return) to deal with nonsynchroneity employing monthly return data. Why the betas estimated using their method exhibit a flatter relation between average returns and betas than using the annual betas is not clear and deserves further attention.
An alternative hypothesis is that the relation to annual betas is spurious, somehow reflecting a correlation between the measurement error in beta and average returns. While this is a possibility that certainly should be explored, we offer two observations that raise doubts about this hypothesis. First, using size portfolios and annual betas estimated using 15 years of past return data, Handa, Kothari, and Wasley (1989) find that annual beta dominates both monthly beta and size in explaining expected returns on size portfolios. Second, we experimented with an alternative estimation procedure for annual betas that should be largely free of any spurious measurement error problem. For each year in which cross-sectional regressions are estimated, the estimates of beta employed are computed using all annual data except the returns for that year.
Thus, the betas are re-estimated each year, as opposed to using the full-period post-ranking estimates. We found that the significance of beta estimated in this manner was reduced only slightly.
Book-to-Market Effect: The Glass is Not Full

Evidence for various portfolios
As noted earlier, a recent paper by Kim (1997) demonstrates that survivor biases cannot account for much of the B/M effect documented in Fama and French (1992) . 6 The Kim (1995) study notwithstanding, empirical evidence presented by KSS continues to pose a challenge to the consistency of the B/M effect. We now review that evidence. First, consider those firms that are on the CRSP tapes but are not on COMPUSTAT. If one looks at the lowest decile of such firms, in terms of market capitalization, one finds that their deviation (alpha) from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor (market, size, and B/M factors) model is quite large, about -7%. These are extremely small and volatile firms, however, and the t-statistics for the significance of this deviation are only -1.65 and -2.18 when the lowest decile is split into two subportfolios. This finding may be related to Loughran's (1997) observations concerning the very low returns on small growth firms.
The statistical significance of these deviations from the three-factor model is not overwhelming, and it is possible that microstructure-related measurement problems color the results for such small firms. Ball, Kothari, and Shanken (1995) , for example, find that eliminating very low-priced stocks substantially reduces the raw returns on the DeBondt and Thaler (1987) five-year contrarian strategy. At the other end of the market capitalization spectrum, KSS examine cross-sectional regressions for the 500 largest stocks. They find that the coefficient relating expected return to B/M is about 40 percent smaller than that obtained using all 12 COMPUSTAT stocks and the t-statistic is 1.96, as compared to 5.71 in FF (1992) using all stocks. Table 5 on equal and value-weighting, suggest that a ratio-driven approach is not adequate either. This is an important topic for further analysis.
Stability over time
A second area of concern is the stability of the B/M effect over time. FF report very similar effects in both halves of their 1963-90 sample using individual-security cross-sectional regressions. Using portfolios based on B/M rankings, we find a very large and highly significant effect over the 1963-77 subperiod, but a much smaller and statistically insignificant effect for 1978 -92. Huson (1995 actually reports a significantly negative B/M effect in the OTC market over the period 1974-90. We do not think it wise to make too much of results for such short periods, but cite these results to provide a balanced view of the B/M evidence.
KSS note the obvious parallel between the book-to-market strategy and a contrarian strategy based on past-return rankings. In general, when forming beliefs about the future, it makes sense to condition those beliefs on all relevant information. This idea can be seen, for example, in a paper by Stambaugh (1996) who considers investments whose histories differ in length -say, the U.S. market and emerging markets. He finds that with correlation between the assets, the longer histories provide important information about the moments of the shorterhistory assets. In our context, the performance of the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) contrarian strategy, based on five-year ranking returns, has been evaluated going back to 1931 (ranking period 1926-30) , while data on the B/M factor only go back to 1963. Fama and French (1996) find that the three-factor model adequately captures the returns on the long-term contrarian strategy. Not surprisingly, the loading on the B/M factor declines monotonically as one moves from the "loser" decile up to the "winner" decile. Thus, returns on the contrarian strategy should have a bearing on our beliefs about future performance of the B/M strategy.
KSS look at excess-return (one-factor) market model alphas for losers and winners based on five-year ranking periods. Interestingly, their numbers imply that the Jensen alpha for one-year post-ranking returns on this contrarian strategy is negative and more than 13 percentage points lower in the pre-1963 period than the post-1962 period (-6.9% vs. 6.5%)! 9 This striking observation, in conjunction with the contrarian-B/M parallel, raises doubts that the future performance of the B/M strategy will meet the standard of the past 30 years. On the other hand, additional relevant information is provided by Davis (1994) , who finds a positive and statistically significant B/M effect over the period . While this is good news for B/M, it is also important to recognize that the Davis study is limited to a sample of large firms for which the coefficient on B/M, like ours for the 500 largest firms, is about half that of FF (1992) . A more formal analysis of this broader conditional perspective on strategies and factor premia is clearly called for, perhaps incorporating the analytical approach of Stambaugh. At a minimum, we hope our discussion engenders a healthy skepticism toward strategies that have performed impressively over a given 30-year period.
Relation of B/M to other determinants of expected returns
Having played "devil's advocate" on the B/M issues, we still come away with the impression that there is an effect, although one that is smaller and less consistent than suggested by the early evidence. We now offer some comments on its relation to the older size effect, and the likelihood of the B/M effect persisting in the future.
First, we note that size and B/M can be very highly negatively correlated for a set of assets. The size-B/M correlation for the 100 size-then beta portfolios used earlier is -0.95 over the period 1963-92. Moreover, the correlation between size and estimated beta for these portfolios is not that much higher than the correlation between B/M and beta, -0.61 as compared to 0.51.
Thus, as has been argued previously for size [Chan and Chen (1988) ], part of the B/M effect may be due to its proxying for the true, but imprecisely estimated, market beta. On the other hand, this conclusion is sensitive to the particular method of portfolio formation. For example, looking at the B/M-sorted deciles in FF (1992), there is a strong positive relation between average return and B/M, but no apparent relation to beta.
Huson (1995) considers a possible relation between liquidity and B/M. He finds that for portfolios of NYSE stocks formed on bid-ask spread and prior five-year return, inclusion of the five-year prior return in cross-sectional regressions eliminates the statistical significance of size, B/M, and spread, while prior return has a t-statistic of -3.23 over the period 1961-90. This, in combination with our earlier observations concerning the five-year contrarian strategy raises further doubts about the B/M effect. A recent paper by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyan (1998) documents a strong negative relation between trading volume and average returns, even after adjusting for risk using the FF three-factor model. This is consistent with a liquidity premium explanation.
Risk or mispricing?
FF have explored the possibility that a B/M factor might be related to shifts in the investment opportunity set, a form of risk that would be priced in the intertemporal CAPMs of Merton (1973) and others. Some support for a risk-based view is provided in Lewellen (1998) . Others, notably Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), Haugen (1995) , MacKinlay (1995) and Daniel and Titman (1997) , argue against a risk-based explanation for the cross-sectional significance of B/M, however.
10 Further doubts are raised by Hawawini and Keim (1997) , who point to the concentration of B/M premia in January. Consistent with mispricing stories, Kothari and Shanken (1997) find that the time-series variation in expected market index returns implicit in regressions on B/M is so large as to cast doubt on explanations based solely on investor rationality. Their post-1940 evidence appears more consistent with market efficiency, however.
The documentation of B/M effects in several countries [Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) and Capaul, Rowley, and Sharpe (1993)] is an impressive finding that would seem, at first glance, to support the mispricing story. This is further supported by the fact that the effects are not very highly correlated across countries [Hawawini and Keim (1997) ]. However, insofar as markets are not well integrated, these observations are also consistent with the possibility that B/M is proxying for other rational, but mismeasured or omitted, determinants of expected returns.
Although difficult to sort out, a combination of risk-based and mispricing effects may well be the reality, making extreme views counterproductive, and wrong.
Conclusions
Annual betas "work" over the periods 1941-1990 and 1927-1990 , in the sense that they are significantly related to average stock returns. Although other variables like size also have explanatory power, the differences in expected returns based solely on annual beta, and those based on size and beta, are surprisingly small. We're not sure why annual beta works, however, and understanding this is an important topic for future research. In the meantime, though, we think this observation provides a ray of hope for those impressed with the compelling logic of modern portfolio theory. Another important related issue is how to best estimate betas from past data in a way that, while retaining the mysterious benefits of annual beta, can be used in a predictive manner for financial decision making.
B/M is also significantly related to expected returns and, over the 1963-92 period, thoroughly dominates any estimate of beta that we've seen. However, the B/M effect is much weaker and far less reliable, statistically, in large firms. In addition, the inconsistent performance of the related contrarian strategy over a longer history raises doubts that the very strong B/M effect observed for the broader universe of stocks in recent history will persist undiminished in the future.
Some evidence [Daniel and Titman (1997) ] points to the B/M ratio as the more fundamental determinant of expected return, in comparison with the B/M risk factor loading.
However, our evidence and that of Loughran (1997) concerning the weaker cross-sectional relation for large firms suggests that sole reliance on the ratio itself is not advisable. Evidence on the related issue of the rationality of the B/M effect is mixed. If the B/M effect is indeed related to risk, liquidity, etc., it can reasonably be expected to persist to some degree in the future. If it has been driven largely by mispricing, though, it obviously is liable to self-destruct, particularly given the enormous attention it has received. If this happens, we will likely be right back where we "started" -with beta.
It is important to remember that beta captures the marginal contribution of an investment to portfolio risk whether it is related to expected return or not. Therefore, investors who believe that systematic mispricing has driven expected returns and will continue to do so in the future should load up on low-beta, high B/M securities, and increase their expected returns while reducing their portfolio risks. Just be sure to be among the first to "get through the door." Table 1 Cross-sectional regressions of monthly returns on beta and firm size: Equal-weighted market index [Reproduced from Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) 
where R pt is the buy-and-hold return on portfolio p for one month during the year beginning from
July 1 of year t to June 30 of year t+1; β p is the full-period post-ranking beta of portfolio p is the slope coefficient from a time-series regression of annual buy-and-hold post-ranking portfolio returns on the returns on an equal-weighted portfolio of all the beta-size portfolios; Size pt-1 is natural log of the average market capitalization in millions of dollars on June 30 of year t of the stocks in portfolio p; γ 0t , γ 1t , and γ 2t are regression parameters; and ε pt is the regression error.
Portfolios are formed in five different ways: i) 20 portfolios by grouping on beta alone; ii) 20 portfolios by grouping on size alone; iii) taking intersections of 10 independent beta or size groupings to obtain 100 portfolios; iv) ranking stocks first on beta into 10 portfolios and then on size within each beta group into 10 portfolios; and v) ranking stocks first on size into 10 portfolios and then on beta within each size group into 10 portfolios. When ranking on beta, the beta for an individual stock is estimated by regressing 24 to 60 monthly portfolio returns ending in Panel B: Size, average market value of equity in millions of dollars Small 3.9 4.1 4.0 4.1 3.9 4.0 3.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.9 2 9.9 9.7 9.7 9.9 9.9 9.7 9.6 9.8 9.7 9.6 9. 25 All securities with CRSP monthly return data available [at the beginning of July of each year from 1927 to 1992] for at least 24 prior months (18 months in case of the first year, 1927) are ranked on firm size (market value of equity) into ten portfolios. Each year, stocks in each size portfolio are grouped into ten portfolios based on their CRSP equal-weighted index betas estimated using up to 60 monthly returns. Equal-weighted annual buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each of the 100 size, then beta ranked portfolios using returns for the July-to-June period. This yields a time series of 66 annual returns for each portfolio, which is used to estimate post-formation betas for the 100 portfolios. The market index used to estimate the post-formation betas is the equal-weighted index of annual buy-and-hold returns on all the stocks available at the beginning of July of each year. Size is the average market value of equity, in millions of dollars, for the stocks in a portfolio. The figures in the table are the time series averages of size for each portfolio. The Avg column at the left of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the parameter values for the beta decile portfolios within each size decile portfolio. The Avg row at the bottom of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the parameter values for the size decile portfolios for each beta decile portfolio. All securities with CRSP monthly return data available [at the beginning of July of each year from 1927 to 1992] for at least 24 prior months (18 months in case of the first year, 1927) are ranked on firm size (market value of equity) into ten portfolios. Each year, stocks in each size portfolio are grouped into ten portfolios based on their CRSP equal-weighted index betas estimated using up to 60 monthly returns. Equal-weighted annual buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each of the 100 size, then beta ranked portfolios using returns for the July-to-June period. This yields a time series of 66 annual returns for each portfolio, which is used to estimate post-formation betas for the 100 portfolios. The market index used to estimate the post-formation betas is the equal-weighted index of annual buy-and-hold returns on all the stocks available at the beginning of July of each year. Size is the time series mean of the annual average market value of equity, in millions of dollars, of the stocks in each size portfolio. Panel A contains the average residuals from 66 annual Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annual returns on the post-formation betas of the 100 equal-weighted size and then beta-ranked portfolios. The average residuals in panels B and C are from Fama-MacBeth regressions using only size, and size and beta, respectively. The Avg column at the left of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the residuals for the beta decile portfolios within each size decile portfolio.
The Avg row at the bottom of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the residuals for the size decile portfolios for each beta decile portfolio. All securities with CRSP monthly return data available [at the beginning of July of each year from 1927 to 1992] for at least 24 prior months (18 months in case of the first year, 1927) are ranked on firm size (market value of equity) into ten portfolios. Each year, stocks in each size portfolio are grouped into ten portfolios based on their CRSP equal-weighted index betas estimated using up to 60 monthly returns. Equal-weighted annual buy-and-hold returns are calculated for each of the 100 size, then beta ranked portfolios using returns for the July-to-June period. This yields a time series of 66 annual returns for each portfolio, which is used to estimate post-formation betas for the 100 portfolios. The market index used to estimate the post-formation betas is the equal-weighted index of annual buy-and-hold returns on all the stocks available at the beginning of July of each year. Size is the time series mean of the annual average market value of equity, in millions of dollars, of the stocks in each size portfolio. Panel A contains the difference between the absolute values of the average residuals from the size-&-beta model and the beta-only model. Size-&-beta model: 66 annual Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of annual returns on size and post-formation betas of the 100 equal-weighted size and then beta-ranked portfolios. Beta-only model has only post-formation beta in the regressions. In panel B, the difference is between the absolute average residuals from the size-&-beta model and the size-only model. The Avg column at the left of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the residuals for the beta decile portfolios within each size decile portfolio.
The Avg row at the bottom of each panel is the equal-weighted average of the residuals for the size decile portfolios for each beta decile portfolio. Portfolio formation procedure for the value-weighted and equal-weighted portfolios is similar to that employed by Fama and French (1992, Table IV) . At the end of each year, Fama and French form 12 portfolios on the basis of ranked values of B/M. Portfolios 2-9 cover deciles, whereas the bottom and top two portfolios (1A, 1B, 10A, and 10B) split the bottom and top deciles. Like Fama and French, we exclude negative B/M stocks. All CRSP-COMPUSTAT stocks with B/M and return data are included. We include NYSE-AMEX stocks, whereas Fama and French include NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. B/M is the ratio of book value of equity to the market capitalization of equity. We report time series average of the portfolio B/M ratios. For the Fama-French portfolios, we report e ln(B/M)
, where ln(B/M) is the time-series average of the natural long of the portfolio B/M. We report the average market capitalization of the stocks in each B/M ranked portfolio. For the Fama-French portfolios, we estimate the average portfolio market capitalization from the time-series average of the natural logarithm of portfolio market values reported in their table IV. Return is the time series average of the equal-or value-weighted annual portfolio returns in percent. Annual returns for the Fama-French portfolios are calculated by compounding the monthly average portfolio returns they report in their table IV.
